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A b s t r a c t. The study is devoted to preliminary nalysis of the Polish petroleum industry 
and the wholesale level of the fuel market in the context of strategic interactions’ research. In 
the paper, the structure of the Polish petroleum industry (refining sector) and the wholesale 
level of the market were analyzed, in order to extract every factors influencing the shape of 
theoretical strategic interaction model. As a result, the key characteristics of the industry, the 
wholesale market, the players and price creation mechanism have been isolated. Basing on 
that findings, the Author has pointed to essential elements of the theoretical model of strategic 
interactions (game model), which can be constructed as a possible model of players’ behavior.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important tasks for economics (and the economists) in 
antitrust litigations is delivering credible procedures or methods which could 
allow for distinguishing between a competitive and uncompetitive conduct 
without exact knowledge of players’ private information. For the main 
stream of industrial organization (see for example Tirole, 1988), one can 
state that for a given market characteristics, the player’s strategies describe 
their behavior. If such an assumption is taken, various quantitative methods 
of detection and measurement of anticompetitive behavior could be devel-
oped. One strand of the research is the development of the so called markers 
of anticompetitive (mostly horizontally collusive) behavior which are uti-
lized within a screening procedure1. Another path is based on an estimation 
and assessment of a market power, residual demand’s estimation or direct 
estimation of players’ strategies. This path encompasses various models and 
methods2. Regardless of the method, every study which is aimed at deliver-
ing evidence of potential distortions of competition should contain, as the 
first step, a study of main structural parameters of an industry (market), the 
main players and the strategic interactions which take place. Abrantes-Metz 
(2013) and Abrantes-Metz (2011), while developing econometric (behavior-
al) screening methods, emphasized that good, reliabl  screen, among others, 
should be ‘based on deep understanding of an industry, nature of competition 
and motivations to anticompetitive behavior’. 
She also stated, as a rule of thumb in screen’s contructions, that “one 
size does not fit all”, which means that even if some typical theoretical mod-
els of strategic behavior associated with quantitative markers can be isolated, 
every industry and market should be treated independently, and examined 
for the main structural parameters. The present paper contains such a study, 
considered as the first, necessary step of an assessment of a strategic behav-
ior of the players in the Polish wholesale fuel market3. The paper consists of 
an introduction and 4 sections. Section 1 contains  brief description of the 
Polish refining industry and major players. Section 2 concentrates on the 
analysis of relevant level of the domestic fuel market. Section 3 investigates 
                                                           
1 For a comprehensive overview see: Harrington (2008), Abrantes-Metz (2011). 
2 Bejger (2009) contains a list of various tools, market power estimation is deeply studied 
in Perloff, Karp and Golan (2007). 
3 On the basis of that research, the Author was able to d velop a theoretical model of stra-
tegic price interactions and econometrically verify some of the behavioral patterns which have 
been inferred on the basis of an industry study and a theoretical model. 
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the mechanism of creation of the wholesale prices. S ction 4 concludes the 
paper.  
1. POLISH PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
The time frame of study encompasses the period from 01.01.2004 to 
31.12.2013, and this time window was taken as relevant for all important 
market characteristics.  
At first, one has to highlight macroeconomic environment of the indus-
try. Since the beginning of the 90s, Poland has been on  of the leading econ-
omies in Central and Eastern Europe. According to the data from Eurostat, 
Poland was also the only country in the European Union whose real GDP 
grew each year from 2002 to 2013. In 2011, according to Eurostat, real GDP 
grew to 4.5%, compared with the average growth in the European Union, 
which amounted to 1.6%. In 2012 the real Polish GDP growth was 2.0%, 
compared to the average decline in the European Union, which amounted to 
0.4%. However, in 2013 the real Polish GDP growth reached 1.6%, com-
pared to the average growth of 0.1% for the whole of the European Union. In 
2013, Poland was the eighth country in terms of real GDP growth on an an-
nual basis, in comparison with other countries of the European Union. The 
situation in the Polish market of liquid fuels followed the general macroeco-
nomic condition of Poland, but intra-market parameters were no less im-
portant. The total consumption of liquid fuels in Poland was reduced in 
2011–2013. According to estimates of the POPiHN4, the total liquid fuel 
consumption (including motor gasoline, diesel fuel (excluding marine fuel), 
LPG, jet fuel, and light and heavy fuel oil) amounted to 24.9 million m3  
in 2013, and was 3.4% lower than in 2012, while in 2012 it amounted to 25.8 
million m3, and was 6.3% lower than in 20115. Diesel motor oil6 continued 
                                                           
4 Polska Organizacja Przemysłu i Handlu Naftowego – The Polish Oil Industry and Trade 
Organization is an employers' organization, consisting of the largest Polish companies in the 
area of production and distribution of liquid fuels, fuel infrastructure and the production and 
distribution of lubricating oils.  
5 Statistical data on liquid fuels are expressed in many different units. In this article every 
effort was made to unify the unit to kilo tons (kt) or cubic meter (m3). Unfortunately, for 
aggregated data, conversion to another unit than the original one is often impossible due to 
different conversion factors for different fuels. Thus, consumption for fuels is interchangeably 
expressed in the text in m3 or kt. 
6 As there are various fuel products with the words “diesel oil” in the name (heavy marine 
diesel oil, for example) a product in interest have to be precisely defined. As diesel oil, or 
diesel in short, we understand unbranded diesel oil for road transport with 10 ppm sulphur 
content. 
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to be the most widely used liquid fuel in Poland, and its share in domestic 
consumption in 2013 was about 60%. In 2013, the Polish market of motor 
gasoline7 reflected the trends occurring in other parts of Europe, and contin-
ued to decline. The demand for motor gasoline, according to the POPiHN 
2013, fell by almost 2.2% (i.e. about 111 thousand. m3) compared to 2012, to 
the level of 4.9 million m3. The decline in demand for fuel is caused by the 
economic slowdown, high retail prices and undisclosed gray market imports. 
More details on gasoline and diesel motor oil supply and demand are provid-
ed further in the text. 
1.1. MAJOR PLAYERS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
The refining sector in Poland is dominated by two companies: Orlen 
Group (PKN Orlen)8 and LOTOS Group (LOTOS)9. Both parent companies 
are partly owned by the state treasury, which holds a 27.5% stake in PKN 
Orlen and a 53.2% stake in Grupa LOTOS, but in fact no strategic decision 
is possible to make without an approval of the Polish government. PKN  
                                                           
7 Motor gasoline (or a gasoline in short) has been dfined as unbranded unleaded 95 oc-
tane gasoline with 10 ppm sulphur content.  
8 PKN Orlen is the main member of the ORLEN Group. ORLEN Group comprises PKN 
ORLEN (the Parent) and various companies based in Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, Malta, Sweden, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Switzerland, Estonia, Latvia and Cana-
da. In December 31st 2013, PKN ORLEN held, directly or indirectly, shares in 90 companies, 
including: 78 subsidiaries, 7 jointly-controlled entities, and 5 associated entities. The refining 
sector of the group consists of two foreign facilities, ORLEN Lietuva (10.2 mln tones of 
annual capacity) and Unipetrol a.s. (8.7 mln tones of annual capacity) and three domestic 
facilities: main refinery located in Płock and two small refineries: Trzebinia Refinery and 
Jedlicze Refinery (360 and 90 kilo tones of capacity respectively). Because our relevant mar-
ket is a domestic one, and the two small refineries of Orlen Group are not important in terms  
of fuel’s production and wholesaling (they specialize chiefly in fuel storage and distribution 
services, production of biocomponents, base oils and fuel oils, as well as regeneration of spent 
oils) the Author concentrated on Płock Refinery as the major player in refining, and all pro-
duction data are valid for this refinery. It was deci d, in order to avoid complication, to name 
the player representing Orlen group in domestic market as PKN Orlen (or PKN in short), but 
one has to remember that this name, in the context of this paper, means Płock’s refinery, and 
all those parts of PKN Orlen which are involved in the activities in the Polish wholesale or 
retail market.  
9 LOTOS Group comprises Grupa LOTOS S.A. (the parent enti y and operator of the re-
finery in Gdańsk) and 22 production and service companies, including: 13 direct and 9 indi-
rect subsidiaries of Grupa LOTOS. Two of them are based outside Poland, in Lithuania and 
Norway. It was decided, in order to avoid complication, to name the player representing 
LOTOS Group in domestic market as LOTOS, but one has to remember that this name, in the 
context of this paper, means the refinery located in Gdańsk and all those parts of Grupa 
LOTOS S.A. which are involved in the activities in the Polish wholesale or retail market. 
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is the owner of Poland’s largest refinery located in Płock (Central Poland), 
which is supplied directly by the crude oil pipelin ‘Druzhba’, while LOTOS 
owns the second largest refinery located in Gdańsk, which can be supplied 
by a side-leg of the ‘Druzhba’ pipeline or from the Baltic Sea. Both refiner-
ies have a high value of Nelson complexity index (9.5 and 10), which means 
that both of them are capable of complex refining of crude10, which contrib-
utes to a significantly greater flexibility in the products produced. This 
greater flexibility enables complex refineries to vary their product mix  
to take advantage of movements in prices and improve their profitability.  
Table 1 provides a detailed overview of the Polish refinery industry  
in terms of production capacities of the mayor players. In the period of inter-
est, the capacities of both players increased systematically and reached the 
grow rate of 21% in the case of PKN, and 133% in the case of LOTOS in the 
sample period. Capacity utilization was very high in the case of both players 
(on average 96% and 94%, respectively), despite the investments, so it can 
be said that the production of both players was capa ity – limited. One 
should notice that such trends are at odds with the European tendencies 
where, since 2009, several refineries, with a combined processing capacity 
of 3.7m bbl/d, have been closed down. This scaling back still seems insuffi-
cient, as many European refineries continue to generate low returns, with 
their processing capacities still relatively underutilized (the average refining 
capacity utilization in Europe was 71% in October 2013)11. The players’ 
market shares in terms of processed crude are roughly in the proportion of 
2/3 to 1/3 at present, due to LOTOS’s higher capacity build up. HHI index of 
refining has declined a bit since the beginning of the sample, but is still very 
high12. For comparison, Central and Eastern Europe region HHI of complex 
capacity in 2009 was equal to 0.162413. 
  
                                                           
10 Complex refining involves a combination of interrelat d processes, such as thermal and 
catalytic cracking, coking and deep conversion of the crude oil feedstock. 
11 Integrated Annual Report 2013 – Grupa LOTOS S.A. 
12 In general, an assessment of the value of an HHI index should be market-specific and 
depend on the purpose of its calculation. As a point f reference for its values in a sense of 
degree of concentration, the US Department’s of Justice merger guidelines are often used, 
where the value of HHI Index greater than 0,180 indicates high market concentration.  
13 Report DGET (2009), p. 42. 
Sylwester Bejger 
AUNC, EKONOMIA XLVI nr 1 (2015) 77–95 
82 


























crude processing market 
share 
Year PKN  PKN PKN  LOTOS  LOTOS  LOTOS  Others* PKN LOTOS HHI of 
pro-
cessing 
2004 13500 12194 90% 4500 4744 105% 1169 0.67 0.26 0.522 
2005 13500 12570 93% 6000 4837 81% 760 0.69 0.27 0.550 
2006 13800 13612 99% 6000 6099 102% 332 0.68 0.30 0.554 
2007 13800 13646 99% 6000 6156 103% 336 0.68 0.31 0.553 
2008 14100 14218 101% 6000 6203 103% 380 0.68 0.30 0.556 
2009 14300 14526 102% 6000 5462 91% 315 0.72 0.27 0.584 
2010 15100 14452 96% 9452 8096 86% 294 0.63 0.35 0.526 
2011 16000 14547 91% 10016 9165 92% 289 0.61 0.38 0.513 
2012 16300 15191 93% 10500 9674 92% 289 0.60 0.38 0.513 
2013 16300 15182 93% 10500 8703 83% 418 0.62 0.36 0.519 
*There were 3 independent refineries, beside Orlen Group and Lotos Group in 2004: 
Czechowice Refinery, Jasło Refinery and Glimar Refinery. Glimar refinery stopped crude 
processing in 2005. From 2009 the data in a column Others replicate processing of two small 
facilities, Trzebinia Refinery and Jedlicze Refinery belonging to Orlen Group. 
Source: PKN Orlen 2013 Factbook, own calculations. 
Table 2 contains basic data for characterization of the fuel marketat the 
country level for two products of interests, specifically. One should under-
stand that if aggregate data on the national level ar  easily obtainable, the 
players’ specific data are more difficult to obtain. However, it was possible 
to extract from various sources the domestic production’s data for PKN and 
LOTOS for gasoline and diesel. They have been used in wholesale market 
descriptions further in the text. One can see from Table 2 that the Polish 
market follows the international-wide trend of substitutions of gasoline by 
diesel motor oil. The official market was growing systematically from 2004 
to 2011 with the average growth rate of 6.3% (with the exception of 2009), 
and started to shrink in the last two years. By visual inspection (Figure 1) 
and basic calculations, it can be determined that diesel production of both 
players loosely follows the consumption (correlation coefficients of 0.52 and 
0.49 for PKN, LOTOS), and there is no such clear dependency in the case of 
gasoline (correlation coefficients of 0.24, 0.50). Interestingly, the produc-
tions of both players have changed unidirectional i the case of diesel (corre-
lation 0.50) and acyclically in the case of gasoline (correlation coefficient  
(–0.39)). It is worth noting that the strongest correlation is between LOTOS 
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gasoline and diesel indices (0.91). As it can be explained on the basis of 
Table 1 and LOTOS’ capacity investments – additional capacity should be 
exploited fully for all types of products, especially when relevant market 
reactions (domestic one in this case) are not binding. To complete an outline 
of the supply – demand situation in the fuel’s market, one should look at the 
net balance of international trade’s figures14. As can be seen, domestic gaso-
line supply has fulfilled the domestic demand almost completely to 2009 and 
was slightly greater then. In the case of diesel, there was clearly a different 
situation till 2012, with significant domestic underproduction of that kind of 
fuel.  
































2004 4116 6481 2753 3347 1216 1258 3969 4605 283 1326 15% 
2005 4008 7246 2861 3521 952 1190 3813 4711 –62 1670 14% 
2006 4144 8222 2723 3995 1418 2226 4141 6221 387 2253 21% 
2007 4161 9532 2610 4568 1346 2607 3957 7175 478 3503 29% 
2008 4197 10518 2800 5078 1246 2920 4046 7998 405 3408 26% 
2009 4272 10387 3055 5330 1282 3225 4337 8555 242 3456 25% 
2010 4222 11717 2736 5359 1425 4050 4161 9409 –51 2662 16% 
2011 3999 12259 2469 5646 1375 4661 3844 10307 54 2614 16% 
2012 3795 11772 2491 5829 1442 4581 3933 10410 –237 914 4% 
2013 3731 11364 2593 6131 1348 4277 3941 10408 –442 279 –1% 
* Positive numbers mean net imports to domestic market.  
**Share of fuels’ import in domestic consumption.  
Source: PKN Orlen 2013 Factbook, Lotos Data book 30.09.2014, EU Oil bulletin, EIA, 
POPiHN annual reports, own calculations. 
                                                           
14 Data in the column “net balance of int. trade” in Table 2 come from EIA database  
(in a case of year 2004 and 2005) and from the POPiHN annual reports for the rest of the 
sample. One should note that those volumes are not the equal calculated difference between 
the sum of productions’ volumes of both players andthe domestic consumption. Unfortunate-
ly, there are no detailed export / import volumes of pr ducts of our interest divided into play-
er’s level. The differences between the calculated volumes and the volumes from the above-
mentioned sources may result from various reasons, such as conversion from cubic meters to 
kilo tones, biases in production data of players etc. 
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Figure 1. Chain indices 
of fuel  
Source: own preparation
2. CHARACTERISTICS 
The analysis of the wholesale level of the Polish fuel market 
preceded by several 
in the wholesale market can include companies with refining capacity see
ing to supply the 
in the market which is used to supply fuel retailers; oil trading and inves
ment entities, who seek to take advantage of market vola ility and arbitrage 
opportunities, industrial companies seeking to meet th ir own requirement
such as airlines and shipping companies. 
Polish wholesale market for unleaded gasoline and motor diesel oil is limited 
to the first two kinds of players. Quoting the prospectus of Grupa LOTOS 
(2014)15, p.156: “The domestic fuel market is supplied from two sources: 
domestic producers (PKN Orlen and the Issuer (i.e. LOTOS)) and importers. 
According to the estimates of POPiHN in 2013, about 91% of the demand in 
the Polish wholesale market was met by Polis
ing 9% of the demand was covered by imports (including imports unde
                                        
15 Unfortunately, POPiHN calculations used in that prospectus are not available publically 
as an independent source (see. p.56 of the Prospectus), so we have no such data for the rest 
of the sample, particularly.
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OF THE WHOLESALE FUEL MARKET 
should 
preliminary observations. Potentially, participants 
market, independent wholesalers, who take a position 
Firstly, it can be stated 
h producers, while the remai














Investigation of the nature of strategic interactions… 
AUNC, EKONOMIA XLVI nr 1 (2015) 77–95 
85
stood as appropriate and intra-EU Community acquisition).” Similar conclu-
sion: “The concentration of the wholesale market for road fuels is very high 
– the joint share of the two domestic refiners is around 90%, the remaining 
10% divided among several smaller wholesalers.” state  DAF/COMP 
(2013)18 Report (p.243). Secondly, it can be assumed that most of the pro-
duction of PKN and LOTOS refineries was supplied to the domestic market 
(wholesale and retail). As can be read in POPiHN annu l report (2013): “The 
main sales market for Polish refineries is the domestic one, which is deter-
mined by economic, trade and logistics factors. At the same time, normal 
foreign trade is continuing, although domestic requirements play a crucial 
role in stimulating foreign exports. Multinationals operating in Poland, as 
well as private companies, are also bringing their foreign purchases onto the 
domestic market, but their share of market supply is only supplementary.” 
Summarizing the above, it can be assumed that: 
– the main players of the Polish wholesale fuel market w re PKN and 
LOTOS in a relevant sample period, 
– as detailed data on volumes of fuels sold on wholesale level are not pub-
lically available, one can proxy those volumes by production  
of PKN and LOTOS in domestic refineries. This assumption  
is based on the conclusion that the Polish fuel market was unbalanced by 
domestic production, and there were no economic, logistic and legal rea-
sons why domestic production was not placed in local (domestic) mar-
ket, 
– even though there were no formal, country specific barriers to entry for 
wholesalers, it can be assumed that an occurrence of any significant 
competition to actual incumbents was highly unlikely because of logis-
tics and legal reasons.16  
The Polish wholesale fuel market can be considered th refore as a duo-
poly with a minor role of independent traders. From now on, we focus on  
                                                           
16 In February 1997 the Government lifted controls on fuel prices in Poland. The market  
is open and no import duties or permits are required. However, companies operating in the oil 
market have to apply for a concession from the Energy Regulations Authority. Granting the 
concession requires an applicant to assemble valuable security in the amount of 10 million 
PLN, and pay a yearly fee dependent on the annual icome. Additionally, wholesalers active 
on the domestic market must keep mandatory fuel resrv . The size of mandatory reserves, 
to be created and maintained by producers and traders, was in 2014 equal to the production of 
76 days and the average daily production or import of fuel oil or fuel carried by producer or 
trader in the previous calendar year. The cost of creating and maintaining the mandatory 
reserves of crude oil or fuels are met by producers and traders who can allocate them to the 
cost of operations. The role of company-owned fuel depots and pipelines in creating competi-
tive advantage is obvious in the wholesale level of the market. 
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the PKN and LOTOS as the major players on that level of the market. It 
should be noticed that PKN has an advantage in logistics infrastructure. The 
ORLEN Group uses a network of complementary infrastructure components: 
fuel terminals, on-shore and off-shore handling terminals, a network of 
product and feedstock pipelines, as well as road an r ilway transport.  
In 2013, pipelines were the key mode of transport fr the ORLEN Group’s 
raw materials and products. PKN ORLEN used 379 km of its own Płock – 
Ostrów Wielkopolski – Wrocław pipeline. For operational purposes related 
to acceptance, storage, release and handling of fuels, in 2013 the ORLEN 
Group’s logistics operations in Poland used 14 company – owned fuel termi-
nals and depots. The sales processes and wholesale customer service were 
centralized at subsidiary ORLEN Paliwa Ltd. Grupa LOTOS has a much 
smaller own infrastructure, with 6 depots. Wholesal operations are provided 
by direct subsidiary LOTOS Paliwa Ltd.  
In order to better understand the circumstances of the Polish wholesale 
fuel market, one has to look at the retail level as well. Table 3 summarizes 
the size of retail distribution networks for the main groups of players at the 
end of 2013. 
Table 3. Filling station in Poland (2013) 
Company Number of stations Market share 
ORLEN Group, including 1778 0.26 
PKN ORLEN – CODO 1338 0.20 
PKN ORLEN – DOFO 440 0.07 
Grupa LOTOS 439 0.07 
Foreign concerns, including 1422 0.21 
BP      461 0.07 
Statoil   354 0.05 
Shell     378 0.06 
Jet/Lukoil 116 0.02 
Hypermarkets network 166 0.02 
Other independent stations 2940 0.44 
Total 6745  
Source: PKN Orlen 2013 Factbook. 
It can be seen from Table 3 that the two main players in the wholesale 
sector have a significant share in retail, too. Especially PKN has a strong 
position in retail (the company estimates the quantity- based market share  
at 35.4%17 in 2013). Unfortunately, according to our knowledg, there are  
no publically available data from both of the players which separate clearly 
                                                           
17 See: Directors’ Report On The Operations Of PKN Orlen In 2013,p.26. 
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the volumes sold as wholesale from those sold in owretail network18. Nev-
ertheless, in order to assess the market structure on the wholesale level in 
some way, the production volumes allocated in the domestic market were 
taken as a proxy of volumes of fuels allocated on that level. In doing so, 
beside the motivation presented earlier, the fact tha PKN and LOTOS are 
the main (and sometimes only) suppliers of fuels for retail (for their own 
retail networks exclusively) in a domestic market, should be taken into con-
sideration. It is considered that “supply view” is the most appropriate for a 
description the B2B level of the market19. Table 4 presents the estimations of 
market shares and HHI for such proxies in the two boundary scenarios. The 
first one, for which both market shares and HHI** are depicted in Table 3, 
assumes that PKN and LOTOS are the only wholesalers on the market (ig-
nores the fringe of 8% to 10% representing the sales of independent players), 
the second one (for which only HHI*** is showed) assumes that all import 
to domestic market is allocated on the wholesale lev l by a “third player”.  
The actual values of HHI are somewhere in between HHI** and HHI*** 
because, on the one hand, the production of major players is not fully allo-
cated in the domestic market20 at a wholesale level, and there is an independ-
ent set of importers and, on the other hand, PKN and LOTOS have been 
importers of fuels themselves, so not the whole import is realized  
by independent players. One can say that the wholesale level of the fuel 
market was highly concentrated (even if HHI*** is considered) in the sam-
ple period, but the market shares of the players indicated some evolutions in 
time. PKN’s share has been rather declining (due to the declining share of 
diesel supply), while LOTOS’ share increased because of the higher growth 
rate of diesel production. In the same period, it could be noticed that the 
domestic supply did not fulfill the domestic demand, however, in the case of 
diesel that was due to real lack of domestic capacities, whereas in the case of 
gasoline the domestic supply and consumption were almost balanced and in 
                                                           
18 In the case of PKN, the author collected such datafor the period of 2005 – 2014 (avail-
able on request), but one should bear in mind that in 2009 the volumes sold to DOFO stations 
were reclassified to retail market sales (previously classified to so cold “refinery sector sales” 
which in organizational structure of PKN means wholesa e) and for years 2012 and 2013 
aggregations in refining products were done (in repo ting of PKN), so sales numbers for 
gasoline also include LPG (so called “light distillates”) and the sales numbers for diesel  
include JET-A1 fuel and light heating oil (so called “medium distillates”). In the case of 
LOTOS it was not possible to separate wholesale volumes from retail ones. 
19 The situation in Poland in the sense of domestic wholesale supply control by domestic 
refineries is very similar to that in New Zealand, as described in Ming-Hua Liu et al.(2010), 
footnote 4. 
20 We are not able to precisely divide export volumes by players. 
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some periods net export of gasoline was the reason for below – 100% ratio 
in the Table 421. 
Table 4. Estimations of market shares and HHI indices 









motor fuels market share 
(Gasoline + Diesel) 








Diesel PKN Lotos HHI**  HHI*** 
2004 96.4% 71.1% 0.69 0.73 0.31 0.27 0.71 0.29 0.589 0.16 0.443 
2005 93.6% 65.0% 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.624 0.17 0.459 
2006 99.9% 75.7% 0.66 0.64 0.34 0.36 0.65 0.35 0.544 0.20 0.387 
2007 95.1% 75.3% 0.66 0.64 0.34 0.36 0.64 0.36 0.542 0.26 0.363 
2008 96.4% 76.0% 0.69 0.63 0.31 0.37 0.65 0.35 0.548 0.24 0.374 
2009 101.5% 82.4% 0.70 0.62 0.30 0.38 0.65 0.35 0.545 0.22 0.379 
2010 97.4% 80.3% 0.66 0.57 0.34 0.43 0.60 0.40 0.519 0.17 0.388 
2011 96.1% 84.1% 0.64 0.55 0.36 0.45 0.57 0.43 0.511 0.16 0.387 
2012 97.4% 88.4% 0.63 0.56 0.37 0.44 0.58 0.42 0.513 0.07 0.445 
2013 93.8% 91.6% 0.66 0.59 0.34 0.41 0.61 0.39 0.523 0.05 0.477 
* Domestic production minus export. 
** Index calculated on a basis of production's market shares of both mayor players in total 
domestic net production. 
*** Index calculated on a basis of shares of both players' production and share of net import 
in a total domestic consumption of fuels. 
Source: own calculation. 
3. WHOLESALE PRICES – CREATION MECHANISM 
An empirical investigation of the strategic interactions of the players is 
based on time series of wholesale prices of PKN and LOTOS. In order to 
understand the ‘nature of competition’, one should ask how those prices can 
be theoretically determined, and what information is available publically on 
such a mechanism. It can be observed that the players officially define their 
wholesale price policies as follows: PKN22: ‘Fuel prices in Poland are set by 
the manufacturers on the basis of market conditions controlled phenomena 
occurring in the global markets petroleum products, the state of the Polish 
economy and fiscal policies of the state. At the heig t of the fuel prices af-
fect mainly: taxes on fuel, i.e. VAT and excise duties, the price of crude oil 
and finished products on world markets23, dollar exchange rate, conditions 
                                                           
21 We can’t forget about biases in data caused by shadow market influence. 
22 http://www.orlen.pl/PL/DlaBiznesu/HurtoweCenyPaliw 
23 All bold by the Author. 
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in the domestic market shaped by competition.” and LOTOS24:’ Daily analy-
sis of: trading prices of fuels and oil in the European markets, the US 
dollar and the euro exchange rates (published by the NBP i.e. Central Bank 
of Poland) and the current situation of demand and supply in the domestic 
market are essential components of the fuel pricing policy of the company.” 
From the above statements, a twofold conclusion can be i ferred: 
– the pricing mechanism of the players corresponds to well-known Import 
Parity Pricing (IPP in short) formula, 
– both of the player are very cautious to admit this is the case and describe 
the formula in a more precise way.  
Even though there are no publically available players’ or competition au-
thorities’ documents about parity pricing mechanism n the Polish fuel mar-
ket, many sources consider that as a fact. As an exmple, the POPiHN’s 
report 2011, p.24, states:”The prices for liquid fuels in Poland are built on 
the basis of the so-called import parity, composed mainly of finished fuel 
trading prices and the US dollar exchange rate and the level of national tax-
es.”  
The IPP pricing is based on the assumption that fuel for road use is 
a tradable good and the ex-refinery price does depend indirectly on the price 
of crude and of the costs of refining at domestic refineries, but mostly on the 
price that the purchaser has to pay for this product in a relevant hub plus 
transport costs and other relevant spreads for the site chosen for storage  
in Poland. The price so determined is what is commonly termed the import 
parity price (IPP) corresponding to the price (FOB) in the international mar-
kets for fuel for road use, plus transport costs, in urance, discharge and 
wharfage. Theoretically, the IPP is the maximum leve  that the domestic 
producers’ wholesale price can reach if there are no obstacles to import.  
One can point to at least two examples where IPP pricing is officially de-
scribed as domestic refineries’ pricing schema, namely Portugal25 and Aus-
tralia26. There is also a significant part of DAF/COMP (2013) report devoted 
to this policy with some interesting opinion dealing with the influence of this 
policy on the competitiveness of a market. It is referred to further in the text. 
In order to define the IPP policy, one has to specify the two key components 
– the formula itself and the reference price indices. As there are no official 
                                                           
24 http://www.lotos.pl/144/dla_biznesu/hurtowe_ceny_paliw. 
25 Portuguese Competition Authority Report (2009). 
26 Report of the ACCC (2007) 
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declarations in the case of Polish refineries, a known version of the IPP for-
mula, from ACCC study in this case needs to be adopte 27:  
IPP based domestic refinery price = a benchmark refinery price + quality 
premium + shipping costs + wharfage + insurance and loss. 
The formula itself is basically similar in different countries, the most im-
portant part of the IPP policy definition is a set of benchmark price indices. 
It can be assumed28 that the reference market for Polish refineries is the 
NWE market represented by Amsterdam – Rotterdam – Antwerp hub. From 
LOTOS’ descriptions of its own model refinery margin one can infer that the 
benchmark indices for fuels are: PRM UNL 10 ppm CIFARA for gasoline 
and ULSD 10 ppm CIF NWE for diesel. Both of them are NWE market quo-
tations published actually by Thomson Reuters. As both of the players report 
their margins in USD/bbl our hypothesis assumed that initial currency for 
calculation of IPP price is USD. This way, one can avoid problems with the 
influence of the exchange rate on the price in domestic currency (PLN), as it 
is assumed that the price in PLN is recalculated by taking (possibly lagged) 
PLN/USD exchange rate. Moreover, the IPP price is a net price, not includ-
ing excise tax and fuel duty29. The IPP price formula can be simplified in the 
following way: 
IPP based domestic refinery price in USD (gasoline, di sel) = PRM UNL  
10 ppm CIFARA or ULSD 10 ppm CIF NWE + spread. 
The last important feature of the pricing mechanism i  the way in which 
prices are publically announced. In the sample period, both players an-
nounced wholesale prices of various products on their w bsites. For our 
purposes, the representative products are: for PKN “unleaded gasoline  
95 octane Eurosuper 95” and “motor diesel oil Ekodiesel”, for LOTOS “un-
leaded gasoline 95 octane” and “motor diesel oil EURODIESEL” As those 
are simply brand names for standard 10ppm products, short names for these 
shall be further used, PKN PB95, PKN ON and LOTOS PB95, LOTOS ON, 
respectively. The prices were announced once a day (the exact hour of pub-
lishing was evolving during the sample period), butthe frequency of the 
daily announcements was irregular at the beginning of the sample, as depict-
ed in Figures 2 and 3. It can be seen that both players started to publish their 
                                                           
27 Ibid, p. 7. 
28 ARA hub is qualified as reference for north part of CEE region in a Report DGET 
(2009).  
29 It has to be remembered that wholesalers are direct payers of those duties. 
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prices in a regular pattern from the beginning of 2006 with regular a
nouncement on weekdays (1 day gap) and with a gap for a Satur





The analysis revealed that both players actually published their prices 
about midnight day t for day t+1, and the prices published on Saturdays are 
valid for Tuesdays, which means that prices are not published on Sundays 
with validity for Mondays. In order to 
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One can observe that the difference in the time of publication does not ex-
ceed 11 minutes with the median equal to 7 minutes.  
Table 5. Announcement of prices (exact times) 
Exact time of price announcement 
Date LOTOS PKN 
12-Jul 11:59 PM   12:06 AM∗ 
16-Jul 12:00 AM 12:03 AM 
17-Jul 12:00 AM 12:07 AM 
18-Jul 12:00 AM 12:03 AM 
19-Jul 11:59 PM 12:10 AM 
22-Jul 11:59 PM 12:01 AM 
23-Jul 11:59 PM 12:06 AM 
25-Jul 11:59 PM 12:08 AM 
26-Jul 11:59 PM 12:02 AM 
29-Jul 12:00 AM 12:08 AM 
31-Jul 11:59 PM 12:10 AM 
1-Aug 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 
2-Aug 12:00 AM 12:00 AM 
5-Aug 12:00 AM 12:09 AM 
6-Aug 11:59 PM 12:08 AM 
7-Aug 11:59 PM 12:08 AM 
8-Aug 12:00 AM 12:06 AM 
9-Aug 12:00 AM 12:05 AM 
12-Aug 12:00 AM 12:11 AM 
13-Aug 12:00 AM 12:01 AM 
14-Aug 11:59 PM 12:09 AM 
16-Aug 12:00 AM 12:04 AM 
∗ AM – means publication after midnight. 
Source: own preparation. 
The observation which is also worth noticing is connected with the grid 
of prices. It was observed that all values of the prices in a sample period 
were integer numbers. Empirical distributions of price’s grid of PB 95 (as an 
example) in sample period are summarized in Table 6.  
Table 6. Price’s grid of PB 95 
∗ Grid is a the biggest prime number divisor of a wholesale price. 
Source: own calculation. 
LOTOS PB  PKN PB 
n grid∗ (PLN) n 
561 1 799 
626 2 881 
1156 5 601 
2343 Total  2281 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of the study was to extract, describe and interpret the 
key characteristics of the Polish refining industry, the wholesale level of 
a domestic fuel market and the players involved in strategic interactions on 
that level.   
The study has analyzed the structure of the Polish petroleum industry 
(refining sector) and the wholesale level of the market at first, to extract 
every factors influencing the shape of theoretical strategic interaction model.  
At that stage of the research, it was concluded that:
– refining industry has been a duopoly with players’ market shares  
in terms of processed crude roughly in proportion 2/3 to 1/3. HHI index 
of refining has equaled 0.538 on average in the sample period which is 
very high (Central and Eastern Europe region HHI of complex capacity 
in 2009 was equal 0.1624 for comparison), 
– the capacities of both players have increased systematically and reached 
the growth rate of 21% in the case of PKN, and 133% in a case of 
LOTOS in a sample period. Such a trend was in contrary o the European 
tendencies, where since 2009 several refineries, with a combined pro-
cessing capacity of 3.7m bbl/d, have been closed down. Capacity utiliza-
tion was very high in the case of both players (on average 96% and 94%, 
respectively), despite the investments, so one can say that the production 
of both players was capacity – limited,  
– after investigation of wholesale fuel market, the Polish wholesale fuel 
market was considered as a duopoly with a minor role of independent 
traders, 
– the Author found the wholesale level of the fuel market to be highly con-
centrated with HHI in the range of 0.410 to 0.546 on average.  
In the sample period, it was noticed that domestic supply did not fulfill 
domestic demand in case of diesel, due to real lack of domestic capaci-
ties, whereas in the case of gasoline the domestic supply and consump-
tion were almost balanced, 
– PKN had strong vertical integration with the retail level, which could be 
an important factor for wholesale level strategic behavior, 
– the wholesale price creation mechanism was studied, th  conclusion be-
ing that the pricing mechanism of the players corresponds to the well-
known Import Parity Pricing (IPP in short) formula. The price levels 
were publically announced by both players on their websites from the 
beginning of the sample period, but regular patterns were being noticed 
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from the beginning of 2006 with announcement on weekdays and with 
a gap for the Saturday-Monday period. 
On the basis of the research, important factors influe cing strategic in-
teraction of market participants can be enumerated:  
– duopolistic market with high concentration, 
– homogenous products30, 
– high barriers to entry, 
– no threats of significant entry to the market in the sample period, 
– capacity constraints for domestic production, 
– inelastic demand31, 
– type of pricing mechanism and price transparency. 
Basing on these characteristics, one can point to essential elements  
of a theoretical model of strategic interactions (game model) which should 
be constructed as a source of a pattern of behavior of the players:  
– price as a strategic variable for players, 
– high probability of existence of common ceiling (focal) level  
of price (IPP price), 
– fixed number n of players in a game horizon (n = 2),  
– capacities treated as exogenous parameters in the gam horizon, 
– single period of a game should be modeled as an non-zero sum, simulta-
neous moves finite game in pure action spaces.  
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